Can we know God is real? by Clouser, Roy
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v79i1.447http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Can we know God is real?
Author:
Roy Clouser1
Affiliation:  
1Department of Philosophy, 
Religion, and Classical 
Studies, The College of New 
Jersey, United States of 
America
Correspondence to:
Roy Clouser
Email:
roy.a.clouser@gmail.com
Postal address:  
204 Bradley Avenue, 
Haddonfield, United States 
of America
Dates:
Received: 27 Nov. 2012
Accepted: 10 Oct. 2013
Published: 18 Aug. 2014
How to cite this article: 
Clouser, R., 2014, ‘Can we 
know God is real?’, Koers 
– Bulletin for Christian 
Scholarship 79(1), Art. #447, 
16 pages. http://dx.doi.
org/10.4102/koers.v79i1.447
Copyright:
© 2014. The Authors.
Licensee: AOSIS 
OpenJournals. This work
is licensed under the
Creative Commons
Attribution License.
This article examines the question as to what ground we have for believing that God is the 
only true Divinity. A re-evaluation of the misconception of faith as ‘blind trust’ or belief 
without reason is provided. From this it is seen that faith, as used in the Bible, may refer to 
the whole of  Christianity as ‘the faith’, to trust based on expectation (not ‘blind trust’), or to 
faith as genuine knowledge derived from experience. Based on the idea of faith as knowledge 
derived from experience, this article investigates religious experiences and the self-evident 
beliefs often arising from these experiences as possibly forming a valid part of our knowledge 
of God. The traditional restrictions on self-evident truths (that a truth must be recognised by 
all who understand it, that it must be a necessary truth and that it must be an infallible truth) 
are shown to be unsupported and contradicted by experience. The definition of ‘self-evidence’ 
defended is that  such beliefs are simply produced in the mind by experience instead of being 
inferred from other beliefs, that they are experienced as prima facie true, and that they are 
irresistible or impossible to disbelieve for the person who had the experience. If we accept this 
definition of self-evident truths, which corresponds to the way they are actually experienced 
rather than the version that includes arbitrary restrictions imposed by a few philosophers, not 
only will beliefs such as that other people have minds, or that our names are what they are, 
be allowed as self-evident.  The experience of the gospel as the truth about God will also be a 
genuine self-evident truth to those who experience it as such.
Author’s preface
The article that follows is written from a frankly Christian point of view. It does not seek 
to prove that God exists or that Christianity is true, as both are assumed from the outset. It 
is also written for Christians in that its focus is on whether Christian faith has the status of 
knowledge or is something less than that. I argue that it is, indeed, knowledge whenever some 
significant cluster of Christian beliefs is experienced as self-evident and that cluster includes 
or presupposes God’s reality. Whenever that happens, those beliefs are justified and so count 
as knowledge, not blind trust. Moreover, I argue that this is a paraphrase of a teaching found 
in the New Testament (NT) itself.
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Kan ons weet God is waarlik God? Hierdie artikel ondersoek die vraag na die gronde waaroor 
ons beskik om te glo dat God die enigste ware Goddelikheid is. ’n Herevaluering van die 
wanopvatting van geloof as ‘blinde vertroue’ of geloof sonder rede word verskaf. Hieruit kan 
gesien word dat geloof, soos dit in die Bybel gebruik word, na die hele Christendom as ‘die 
geloof’ kan verwys, dus, na vertroue wat op verwagting gebaseer is, en nie blinde vertroue nie; 
dit kan ook verwys geloof as kennis wat van ervaring afgelei is. Hierdie artikel maak gebruik 
van die idee dat geloof kennis is wat van ervaring afgelei word om ondersoek in te stel na 
die religieuse ervarings en die self-evidente oortuigings wat dikwels vanuit hierdie ervarings 
ontstaan as ‘n moontlik geldige deel van ons kennis van God. Daar word aangetoon dat die 
tradisionele beperkings wat op self-evidente waarhede geplaas word (dat ‘n waarheid deur 
almal wat dit verstaan erken moet word, dat dit ‘n noodsaaklike waarheid moet wees en dat 
dit ‘n onfeilbare waarheid moet wees) nie oortuigend is nie en nuwe kriteria word voorgestel. 
‘Self-evident’ is dan oortuigings wat eenvoudig deur ervaring in die verstand geproduseer 
word en dit is vir die persoon wat die ervaring beleef onmoontlik of onweerstaanbaar om 
die oortuigings nié te glo nie. Indien ons hierdie definisie van self-evidente waarheid, wat 
ooreenstem met regte ervaring eerder as met daardie weergawe waarin arbitrêre beperkings 
deur ‘n paar filosowe voorgeskryf word, aanvaar, sal nie net oortuigings soos dat alle persone 
‘n verstand het of dat ons name is wat dit is, as self-evident aanvaar word nie. Ook die ervaring 
van die evangelie as die waarheid omtrent God sal as ‘n egte self-evidente waarheid aanvaar 
kan word deur diegene wat dit as sodanig ervaar.
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This conclusion is not, however, presented as a proof of 
God’s existence. In fact, I argue that God’s existence cannot 
be proven – though it can be known. Nor am I assuming 
that knowledge must be defined as justified true belief. 
Including the truth of a belief in the definition of knowledge 
is analogous to defining veridical perception as normal 
perception of something that really exists. In both cases it 
can only be more of the same kind of experience that first 
produced a belief or a perception that could possibly provide 
the criteria for determining that the belief is true or the 
perception is veridical. Thus including the truth of a belief 
in the definition of knowledge makes every knowledge claim 
either hopelessly circular or entangled in an infinite regress. 
For these reasons I take knowledge to be justified belief, and 
argue here that the experience of a belief’s self-evidence 
counts as justification.
The Christian view of the grounds  
of belief in God
Faith
The question taken up in this essay can be posed this way: 
On what ground do we believe that the only true Divinity is 
the Triune Creator God who manifested himself incarnate 
in Jesus Christ? Often the first answer I get is: ‘Belief in 
God’s reality is a matter of faith; we take it on faith that God 
exists’. And because this is such a widely accepted answer, 
it is all the more important to see right away why it is sorely 
in need of clarification. 
This clarification is necessary because there are so many 
misunderstandings about the meaning of the word ‘faith’ as it 
is used in connection with religious belief. For example, Mark 
Twain once quipped that ‘Faith is believin’ what you know 
ain’t so’ and many other writers have done almost as badly. 
‘Faith’ has been defined as ‘belief beyond the evidence’, or 
even ‘belief despite the evidence’, and it is widely assumed to 
mean blind trust by which someone takes a ‘leap of faith’. So 
it is important that we take some time to see how the writers 
of the New Testament use the term. 
The first clarification is that they never use ‘faith’ in any of 
the senses just mentioned. No one can possibly believe what 
he or she knows to be false, and no New Testament writer 
uses ‘faith‘ to mean belief against evidence, belief beyond the 
evidence, or a blind ‘leap of faith’. 
The second clarification concerns the way the meaning 
of the term ‘faith’ was transformed by New Testament 
writers. Every writer of the New Testament was, so far as 
we know, an observant Jew who had come to believe that 
Jesus was the promised Messiah. Not surprisingly, they all 
show great familiarity with the Old Testament (OT). But the 
term ‘faith’ appears only once in the entire Old Testament! That 
single occurrence is in the prophet Habakkuk, where he says: 
‘The just shall live by faith.’ By way of contrast, the New 
Testament, which is less than one-quarter the size of the Old 
Testament, uses the term ‘faith’ at least 245 times. How are 
we to understand this difference? Why do New Testament 
writers make prolific use of a term that had played almost no 
role in their religious life prior to becoming Christians?
The need for a new term for religious belief was the same 
need that required those authors to write in Greek rather 
than in Hebrew: the gospel of Jesus Christ was to be good 
news not only for Jews but for the entire gentile world as 
well. For that reason, the record and interpretation of the 
life and work of Christ needed to be in the international 
language of that day, which was Greek. Moreover, it needed 
a term for religious belief that did not assume the hearers of 
the gospel message were already familiar with the history of 
God’s dealings with Israel. It had to challenge gentile pagans 
whose general outlook on religion was enormously different 
from the way it was thought of in Israel. 
In Israel God was known to his people by his mighty acts 
which were both recorded and interpreted by its priests, 
scribes and prophets. That is why Old Testament writers 
refer often to God being known to Israel by his presence 
amongst them. There was nothing speculative about that 
knowledge; it was not a theory they proposed to explain 
anything, but reports of Israel’s experiences of God’s 
covenantal care. For the observant Jew, belief in God was 
what we would now call belief by acquaintance. God’s 
presence was constantly experienced in a variety of ways, 
and the stories of his past saving actions were woven into 
the very fabric of Israel’s national consciousness. There 
were, for example, God’s appearances to the Patriarchs, 
his mighty deliverance of Israel from Egypt, his leading 
the people by a pillar of cloud and a pillar of fire, and the 
miracles performed by the prophets. Most important of all 
was God’s constant and continual presence in the holiest 
place of the Temple above the Ark of the Covenant. Israel 
knew God because God lived with Israel.1 
In this setting it made sense for the prophets to call for 
faithfulness, to issue reminders of what Israel owed God in 
return for his covenant-love. But there was no need for a 
distinct term for religious belief such as ‘faith’. Israel’s belief in 
God was never mere belief, but belief that was also knowledge 
in the sense of an intense experiential relationship. In fact, 
the same term was used in Hebrew for knowing God as was 
used for conjugal relations of husband and wife (Gn 4:1: ‘And 
Adam knew his wife and she conceived ...’). So there was no 
debate in Israel concerning whether God’s reality could be 
known, as opposed to whether it was mere speculation or 
opinion. By way of contrast, that was exactly the debate which 
had occupied Greek and Roman poets and philosophers 
for hundreds of years prior to the rise of Christianity. In 
Greece, the ultimate ‘wisdom’ about religious belief was 
Protagoras’ famous comment: ‘Concerning the gods, it 
is not possible to know whether they are or are not ...’ By 
contrast, in Israel the verdict on the same subject was: ‘The 
fool has said in his heart “There is no God”’ (Ps 14:1, 53:1).
1.Israel also experienced God’s absence, of course, as that is lamented in the Psalms, 
Job and Jeremiah. But God’s absence can be lamented only because it is contrasted 
with his presence. 
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In the debate over what counts as knowledge, Greek 
philosophers had developed a specific terminology for 
highlighting the difference between beliefs that are merely 
opinions and beliefs we have the intellectual right to say 
are certainties. From Plato onwards the terminology used 
was to call beliefs we are entitled to be certain of ‘episteme’ 
[knowledge], whereas the term ‘pistis’ [opinion] was reserved 
for mere opinions no one is entitled to be certain of. 
I’m not suggesting that Jews were not every bit as much aware 
of the difference between mere opinion and certainty as the 
Greeks and Romans (it occurs in Jos 23:13, for example). The 
difference between belief that is merely opinion and belief 
that is certain knowledge is a common one. No one has to be 
a philosopher to be aware that often we are justified in being 
sure of a particular belief, and to be equally well aware that at 
other times beliefs we hold are merely opinions we trust to a 
lesser degree than certainty. I like the way this point was put 
by one of my favourite mystery writers: ‘There’s knowing 
and there’s knowing for sure and there’s a space between the 
two of them a man can get lost in’ (Hill 1998:353).
For example, the belief that you will go to bed before 
10 o’clock tonight or that next month will be unusually sunny 
are merely opinions. They may turn out to be true, but you 
have no good reason to be certain of them in advance. Other 
beliefs we are not justified in being certain of are promises we 
take on trust. If a friend promises to keep a secret, we can’t be 
completely certain the promise will be kept until it has been. 
Many of the beliefs we accept on the say-so of others are in 
the same boat, such as your belief in the accuracy of a friend’s 
report of a car accident you did not witness. 
From now on I will refer to the opinions we form, including 
promises we take on trust, as beliefs we accept rather than as 
beliefs we know. I will use ‘know’ only for the ones we are 
justified in being sure of beyond a reasonable doubt. On this 
use of the terms your belief in a friend’s account of the car 
accident is an opinion you accept, whereas your belief that in 
the natural number series 1 + 1 = 2 or that you are now seeing 
these words on this page is knowledge. 
Since this is a commonly recognised distinction, it should 
not surprise us that the writers of the New Testament 
(especially St Paul, St John, St Luke and the author of 
Hebrews) were also aware of the difference between opinion 
and certainty. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose they 
were unaware that it had played a large role in the history 
of pagan thought about religion. Thus it should also not 
surprise us that they needed a new terminology which 
would differ sharply from the pagan intellectual tradition 
and at the same time communicate the Jewish (and now 
Christian) view of religious belief to those whose thinking 
had been formed by that pagan tradition. 
In the dominant pagan Greek intellectual tradition, the only 
beliefs that were certain (episteme) were those which are 
either self-evident or proven, and the only beliefs that were 
allowed as self-evident were (with a few exceptions) the 
truths of logic and mathematics. In contrast, what we find 
in the New Testament completely ignores the dichotomy 
of episteme and pistis that had been developed by pagan 
thinkers. The term episteme occurs only four times and never 
means certainty as contrasted to mere opinion.2 What those 
writers did was to transform the term ‘pistis’ (translated as 
‘faith’) into a term for religious belief generally, and then 
use it in three specific senses.
The three senses of ‘faith’ in the New Testament
One of these senses, entirely new to the Greek language, was 
that they used ‘faith’ (pistis) to refer to the whole of the Christian 
religion – to all that God had revealed. This is what we find 
whenever they use it as a noun referring to Christianity as ‘the 
Faith’. It occurs, for example, in such expressions as: ‘the Faith 
once delivered to the saints’ (Jude 3) or ‘... continue in the Faith 
firmly established ...’ (Col 1:23).
The second sense for the term in the New Testament is a 
little bit closer to the Greek meaning of ‘mere opinion’, and 
is also the sense that is closest to the way we most often use 
‘faith’ in a non-religious context today. In this second sense, 
‘faith’ means trust in someone. It is the sense used when 
New Testament writers admonish us to trust God to keep 
his promises, and when they praise believers of the past for 
having done so. For example: ‘For we walk by faith not by 
sight ...’ (2 Cor 5:7) and ‘... all these died in faith without 
having received the promises ...’ (Heb 11:13). 
The way this is ‘a bit closer’ to the traditional Greek usage is 
a subtle point. St Paul and the author of Hebrews both take 
it that when God makes a promise we have every right to be 
confident that it will be fulfilled. Nevertheless, they both still 
regard that confidence as something less than the complete 
certainty that would come from actually seeing the promise 
fulfilled. So what Paul says amounts to: We ‘walk’ (conduct 
our lives) by ‘faith’ (trust in the promises we know God has 
made) not by sight (not yet having seen the promises fulfilled). 
Behind this distinction lies an even more stringent criterion 
for certainty than many modern theories of knowledge have 
demanded.3 Still, it does not leave this second sense of ‘faith’ 
as mere opinion or blind trust. Instead, it is expectation based on 
a promise where the promisor is God but the promise has not 
yet been fulfilled. Thus it is confident expectation for a reason. 
In fact, it is expectation that is justified by the best possible 
reason short of directly witnessing the promise fulfilled. 
Moreover, Hebrews adds even more to the reason behind 
this second sense of ‘faith’. Besides pointing out that it is God 
who has promised something, Hebrews 11 makes clear that 
the ground on which we are urged to rely on God’s promises 
for the future is his record of having been faithful to them in 
the past. So even the second sense of ‘faith’ never amounts to 
2.It is also never used by St Paul, who is the primary author of the new senses of 
‘faith’. The four loci are: Acts 10:28, 15:7, James 4:14, and Jude 10. Paul is not alone 
in using the new senses of ‘faith’, however. The author of Hebrews and St John also 
employ them.
3.John Locke (1959:383), for example, took a promise from God as a certainty: ‘We 
may as well doubt of our own being, as we can whether any revelation from God be 
true. So that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves 
no manner of room for doubt or hesitation’.
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v79i1.447http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 4 of 16
a ‘leap in the dark’. Instead, Bible writers always admonish 
us to trust God’s promises for the same reason we would 
trust another human being to keep a promise: the promisor’s 
past record of faithfulness. 
But the New Testament writers also use ‘faith’ in a third way, 
a sense which moves the entire matter of religious belief 
in line with their Jewish background. In this third usage it 
means belief that is also knowledge in the sense of certainty 
derived from experience. 
For example, St Paul chides some of the members of the 
church at Galatia for thinking they must earn their salvation 
by keeping religious regulations. In rebuttal he asks them: 
‘Did you receive the Holy Spirit by hearing [the gospel] with 
faith or by the works of the Law?’ There the term ‘faith’ 
cannot mean trusting in God’s promises, since the good 
news that the Messiah has come is not merely a promise at 
that point but an accomplished fact. Nor is it a noun naming 
the Christian religion as a whole. It can refer to nothing else 
than belief in God’s reality and to the truth of the claim that 
God offers salvation in the gospel. It is significant, then, 
that this very same belief is often referred to as ‘knowledge’ 
elsewhere in the New Testament, reflecting the Old 
Testament expression ‘the knowledge of God’. 
Another place where the term ‘faith’ is used to mean belief 
that is certain is Hebrews 11. There we are told: ‘Without 
faith it is impossible to please [God], for whoever would come 
to him must believe that he exists and that he rewards those 
who seek him’ (Heb 11:6). This same belief, however, is also 
described elsewhere as ‘trustworthy and deserving of full 
acceptance’ (1 Tm 1:15), and equivalent to knowing God (Jn 
17:3; 1 Cor 8:6, 7; 1 Jn 4:16). Those who have faith in this sense 
are spoken of as ones who ‘believe and know the truth’ (1 Tm 
4:3), so it is clear that this third sense of ‘faith’ is not mere 
belief but belief which is also certainty. The same is true of 
Peter’s confession in John 6:69: ‘Lord to whom shall we go? 
You have the words of eternal life. And we believe and know 
that you are the Christ, the Son of God.’
For these reasons the statement quoted from Hebrews 11:6 
should be seen as starting with the third sense of faith and 
proceeding to the second sense. The faith in God’s existence 
is certain knowledge, whereas the faith that he rewards those 
who seek him is trust in God’s promises.4 
This third use of ‘faith’ is so unlike our common English 
usage now that it can easily be missed. In ordinary speech 
we never use that term to mean that we are certain of 
something, but New Testament writers do. The reference 
to 1 Timothy 4:3 is only one of a number of times they 
speak about Christian teachings which are matters of faith 
4.This difference was also recognised by the famous commentator on Hebrews, 
Franz Delitzsch. Delitzsch says that belief that God exists is ‘the faith of assured 
conviction’, whereas belief that he rewards those who seek him is ‘the faith 
of confident expectation’. This corresponds to my third and second senses of 
‘faith’, assuming that Delitzsche used ‘assured’ as a synonym for ‘justified’ 
(Delitzsche 1952:230).
in the sense that they are teachings ‘we believe and know’.5 
Moreover, neither the New Testament authors nor any writers 
of the Hebrew Bible ever speak of the belief that God is real as faith 
in the sense of mere opinion or hope. Rather, they always speak of 
it as knowledge we are entitled to be certain of. 
Other Christian thinkers who saw this point 
Unfortunately, there are a number of prominent Christian 
thinkers who missed this point. Nevertheless, there is also 
a significant tradition of others who did not miss it. In fact, 
these thinkers not only recognised that New Testament 
writers use this third sense of ‘faith’, but they employed it the 
same way in their own writings, making clear that they use 
it as equivalent to sure and certain knowledge. For example:
Gregory of Nyssa:
[Faith] makes the invisible our own, assuring us of the 
imperceptible by its own certainty about it. (Pelikan 1992:217) 
(emphasis added)
Gregory Naziansus:
Faith is what gives fullness to our reasoning. (Pelikan 
1992:27)
Basil of Caesarea: 
Knowledge of the divine essence involves perception of its 
incomprehensibility, and the object of our worship is not 
that of which we comprehend the essence, but of which 
we comprehend only that the essence exists. (Pelikan 1992:302) 
(emphasis added)
Luther:
Faith is a living, bold trust in God’s grace, so certain of God’s 
favor that it would risk death a thousand times trusting in 
it. Such confidence and knowledge of God’s grace makes you 
happy, joyful and bold in your relationship with God and all 
creatures. The Holy Spirit makes this happen through faith. 
(Luther, 1854, 125) (emphasis added)
Calvin:
For faith includes not merely the knowledge that God is, 
but, also, nay chiefly, a perception of his will toward us. 
(Calvin 1953, III:ii, 6)
But the human mind, when blinded and darkened is very far 
from being able to rise to a proper knowledge of the divine 
will ... Hence, in order that the word of God may gain full 
credit, the mind must be enlightened ... from some other 
quarter. We shall now have a full definition of Faith if we 
say that it is a firm and sure knowledge of the divine favor 
toward us, founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, 
and revealed to our minds, and sealed on our hearts, by the 
Holy Spirit. (Calvin 1953, III:ii, 7) (emphasis added)
Pascal:
By faith we know [God’s] existence ... (Pascal 1960:93) (emphasis 
added)
To sum up, the term ‘faith’ is used in the New Testament to 
mean:
1. The Christian religion as a whole.
2. Taking God’s promises and other revealed information 
5.Luke 1:4; John 6:69; Acts 12:11, 22:30, 25:26; I Timothy 2:4, 4:3; I John 2:3, 4:16, 
5:13. Some of these simply take notice of the difference between opinion and 
knowing for certain, but others of them also apply that difference in order to say 
that we not only believe but ‘know’ God and the truth of the gospel.
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on trust. This is not blind faith, however, because it is 
based on God’s record of past covenant faithfulness.
3. Belief that God is real and offers us the gospel, in which 
case faith means we both ‘believe and know’. 
But if believing that God is the one and only divine Creator is 
faith in the third sense, the sense that is actually equivalent to 
knowledge, what is it that justifies this certainty and how do 
we come to acquire it? 
The New Testament actually answers these questions quite 
clearly despite the fact that a myriad of writers on the subject 
have preferred to ignore what it says and to construct their 
own theories about it instead. (I am not suggesting that the NT 
actually attempts to give a full account of religious knowledge, 
let alone an entire epistemology. But it teaches more that needs 
to be included in any epistemology than the majority of writers 
on the subject have recognised.) The New Testament’s own 
answer is that we know God is real by experiencing God. With 
the addition of this point, the third sense of ‘faith’ completes 
the project of replacing the pagan gentile outlook on religion 
with the Jewish–Christian understanding.6
Religious experience
The New Testament explicitly mentions a number of different 
ways people can and do experience God, and there are even 
more ways this happens than those it explicitly mentions. For 
example, the book of Acts tells of the experience of Saul on 
the road to Damascus. In fact, however, that experience is not 
unique. Take the case of Sadu Sundar Singh. Singh had been 
a devout Sikh all his life. Eventually he became discouraged 
with Sikhism and set out to find God, and he did so with 
the pre-conviction that anything might be the truth except 
Christianity. Early one morning, he says:
In the room where I was praying I saw a great light. I thought the 
place was on fire .... Then the thought came to me that this might 
be an answer that God sent me. Then as I prayed and looked 
into the light, I saw the form of the Lord Jesus Christ ... whom I 
had been insulting a few days before .... I heard a voice saying in 
Hindustani ‘How long will you persecute me? I have come to save 
you; you were praying to know the right way. Why do you not 
take it?’ ... [So] I fell at his feet and got this wonderful peace which 
I could not get anywhere else. (Streeter & Appasamy 1921:5–7)
Another sort of experiencing God, one that is not mentioned 
in the New Testament, is one in which nothing is seen or 
heard but God’s presence is sensed. There are many such 
reports over many centuries that are amazingly alike, but 
here is a contemporary one that was related to me by the 
person who had it:
I was alone for the evening and decided to try reading the gospel 
of John as you suggested, convinced it could make no difference 
to my skepticism about God. I picked up the Bible, turned to 
John, and suddenly I was over- whelmed by a presence that 
filled the room. I closed the book and decided my mind was 
6.It is impossible to say to what extent this ‘project’ was self-conscious, but it could 
have been. The writer whose work most evinces it is St Paul, who was conversant 
with the Greco-Roman intellectual tradition, quotes their poets, and even refers to 
philosophy (Col 2:8). 
playing tricks on me. I’d get a shower, calm down, and come 
back to it. I felt foolish at being spooked. ‘It’s just a book!’ I said, 
laughing. But when I tried to read again the presence was more 
over-powering than before. It wasn’t threatening. In fact it was 
powerfully loving. But I threw the Bible across the room and 
yelled, ‘Go away and leave me alone! I like my life the way it is!’ 
Yet it persisted, and when I tried again to read the gospel it all 
looked undeniably true. (James 1929)
There are yet other sorts of experiences of God besides 
visions and the sense of God’s presence, such as that of 
a mystical union – a oneness with God that is literally 
indescribable. There are also instances in which ordinary 
events become transparent to their dependency on God, or 
are experienced as revealing God’s will. It is not important 
to the certainty of the beliefs generated just which type 
of experience generates them, any more than it matters 
precisely what the contents of the experiences are. No 
matter whether the avenue of experience is ordinary 
perception (sight, touch, sound, smell, taste), extraordinary 
perception (a sense of God’s presence, or mystical union), 
memory, reflection, or whatever, the crucial point is that the 
experience generates a belief that is prima facie and irresistibly 
true to the person who has it. 
That this is equivalent to such a belief’s being self-evident 
has been consistently missed in discussions of religious 
experience. Even William James’s monumental work, The 
varieties of religious experience, failed on this point despite 
how close James came to seeing it. James (1929) says of the 
stranger experiences:
One may indeed be entirely without them, ... but if you do 
have them at all strongly, the probability is that you cannot 
help regarding them as genuine perceptions of truth, as 
revelations of a kind of reality which no adverse argument, 
however unanswerable by you in words, can expel from your 
belief. (pp. 72–73) 
No doubt he stopped short of recognising this as a description 
of self-evidence owing to the traditional restrictions the 
western intellectual tradition had placed on what may count 
as self-evident. 
The experience of self-evidence
Missing this point is also why Thomas Hobbes got things 
exactly wrong when he quipped: ‘When a man says God 
spake to him in a dream he says no more than that he dreamed 
God spake to him’. What Hobbes missed is precisely that 
quality of an experience which philosophers have long called 
‘self-evidence’. That is the feature of any experience – dreams 
included – that can justify the person having the experience 
in the belief that it is communication from God. 
It is a fact that believers often experience God’s presence, 
nearness, comfort, judgement, encouragement, and the 
like, in a wide variety of ways, each of which includes that 
it is self-evident it is God who is experienced. That said, it 
remains true that amongst all the varied experiences, there 
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is one particular type of experience that is primary over the 
others: the experience of encountering God through his word 
as recorded in scripture. This is the primary sense of religious 
experience because: (1) whether or not a person has any of the 
more unusual experiences (and most believers do not), every 
Christian experiences as self-evident that the gospel is the 
truth about God from God, and (2) it is scripture that provides 
the basis for the interpretation of the other sorts of experience. 
As you can see, then, on this view an experience isn’t 
religious only if it is miraculous or very strange. Rather, a 
religious experience is any experience that generates, deepens or 
confirms a religious belief. The question that is always posed 
by critics is whether such experiences not only generate but 
can justify that belief. The answer I’m proposing is: Yes, if the 
belief generated is experienced as a self-evident truth. 
Both the Old and the New Testaments speak of just such 
experiences, and do so by using the same visual metaphors 
for self-evidence that philosophers, mathematicians and 
logicians have long used. The Psalmist remarks upon the 
experience of seeing the truth when he says ‘in your light 
we see light’ (Ps 36:9), and ‘your light is truth’ (Ps 43:3). This 
is continued by the New Testament’s talk about ‘the light 
of the gospel’ shining in our hearts (Jn 1:6–9; Acts 26:17, 18; 
Rm 11:8, 10; 2 Cor 4:4, 6; Eph 5:8, 9; 1 Pt 2:9) and about our 
hearts having been previously ‘darkened’ because we were 
born ‘blind’ to the truth about God (Mt 13:13–16; 15:14; 
Mk 8:17, 18; Jn 9:39). Most telling of all is the expression 
St Paul uses in Romans 1:21 and Ephesians 1:18, where he 
speaks of our being ‘enlightened’ by the Holy Spirit so that 
we ‘see’ God’s truth with ‘the eyes of our mind’ (the term in 
Greek is actually ‘heart’ not ‘mind’).
Paul doesn’t explicitly use the expression ‘self-evident’ here. 
But by insisting that people come to know God when his 
Spirit opens their hearts so that they ‘see’ for themselves the 
truth of the gospel, he is using the same language that the 
leading thinkers of the Pagan world had used for centuries 
to talk of beliefs that are self-evident and therefore self-
justifying. At the same time, he and other New Testament 
writers transformed the scope of what had been allowed as 
self-evident in the pagan philosophical tradition. Instead 
of self-evidence being confined to truths of mathematics 
and logic (and a few metaphysical principles), the New 
Testament writers take it to refer to all the varied experiences 
by which human beings encounter God, including those by 
which ‘his Spirit bears witness with our spirit that we are 
the children of God’ (Rm 8:16). 
At this point some readers may be tempted to object to 
identifying any type of religious experience as self-evident. 
It may seem to them that self-evidence is a highly abstract 
idea that arose in the context of such lofty endeavours as 
mathematics, logic and philosophy. For that reason it could 
seem highly artificial to introduce it into the sweaty realm of 
actual lived experience – and religious experience at that!
However plausible this objection might at first appear, it 
actually gets things backwards. If we have learned anything 
from Wittgenstein, it should at least be that the experience of 
certainty that needs no justification is part of our everyday 
lives. It is an experience that first arises in our lived 
engagement with the world around us, and not in the context 
of abstract theorising. As he says in On certainty:
358. Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something 
akin to hastiness or superficiality. But as a form of life. (That 
is very badly expressed and badly thought as well.) 359. But it 
means that I want to conceive it as some-thing that lies beyond 
being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal. 
(Wittgenstein 1972:46e, 47)
My point is that those engaged in theoretical enterprises 
recognised in them states of affairs that had a certainty like 
that of their pre-theoretical experience. They borrowed the 
idea of that certainty, re-christened it ‘self-evidence’, and 
then attempted to kidnap it by declaring it to be solely the 
property of abstract truths. The New Testament position 
concerning the certainty of the experience of God therefore 
returns that experience to its pre-theoretical home ground. 
My proposal, then, is that this transformed idea of self-
evidence is therefore the right way to understand the 
Jewish–Christian talk about God opening a person’s heart 
so that the person ‘sees’ the truth of God’s word. And the 
New Testament’s talk about God removing a person’s 
spiritual blindness so that he or she can ‘see’ the gospel to 
be true means that it becomes self-evident to that person 
that the gospel is the truth about God from God. Thus, 
when a cluster of scripture teachings is experienced in this 
way, that is equivalent to hearing God speak.
It is this position that should be taken as the New Testament’s 
answer to the usual sceptical questions about the more 
unusual experiences mentioned above. They are often 
attacked as being pathologies such as hallucinations, etc. The 
proper reply to these attacks concerns itself with the self-
evidence of the beliefs conveyed, and ignores the debates 
about the state of the experiencer. Debates over whether the 
experience was veridical or not go nowhere: those who deny 
God’s reality will never admit that any such experiences 
really come from God, whereas those who believe in God 
because of such experiences will never be shaken in their 
conviction that they came from God. The position developed 
here circumvents these debates. 
This position should also be viewed as the New Testament’s 
reply to such sceptical questions as, ‘How did Abraham (or 
Moses or Jesus) know it was God who was talking to him?’ 
And it also answers the question how we can know the 
Bible is the record of the covenants God made with human 
beings. In each case the beliefs in question are justified by the 
experience that it is self-evident that it is God who has made 
himself known. 
One last consequence: on this position, belief in God’s reality 
is not a theory, and therefore needs no proof. Whatever we 
experience as self-evident doesn’t need proof; it is theories 
– educated guesses – that need evidence and proof. 
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Two Christian writers who have seen this point 
I have already taken note of the way many writers have 
preferred to ignore what the New Testament has to say 
about the grounds for belief in God when constructing their 
theories of religious belief. But I will now quote two thinkers 
who did not ignore the New Testament on this topic, but 
captured and expressed its teaching beautifully. One of these 
is a theologian and Protestant; the other is a scientist and 
Catholic. The first is from John Calvin:
As to the question, How shall we be persuaded that [scripture] 
came from God ... it is just the same as if we were asked, How 
shall we learn to distinguish light from darkness, white from 
black, sweet from bitter? Scripture bears upon the face of it as 
clear evidence of its truth as white and black do of their color, 
sweet and bitter of their taste. (Calvin 1953, I:vii, 2)
… [unbelieving] men think that religion rests only on opinion 
and, therefore, that they may not believe anything foolishly, 
or on slight grounds, desire and insist to have it proved by 
reason that Moses and the prophets were divinely inspired. But 
I answer that the testimony of the Spirit is superior to reason. 
(Calvin 1953, I:vii, 4)
… Scripture, carrying its own evidence along with it, deigns not 
to submit to proofs and arguments, but owes the full conviction 
with which we ought to receive it to the testimony of the Spirit of 
God …. (Calvin 1953,I:vii, 5)
Such, then, is a conviction that asks not for reasons ... a knowledge 
which accords with the highest reason, namely, knowledge in 
which the mind rests more securely than any reasons … I say 
nothing more than what every believer experiences in himself 
though my words fall far short of the reality. (Calvin 1953, I:vii, 5)
The second is from Blaise Pascal (1960):
We know truth not only with the reason, but also with the heart. 
It is in this latter way that we recognize first principles, and it is 
in vain that reason, which has no part therein tries to impugn 
them … For the knowledge of first principles – for example space, 
time, motion, and number, [is] as sure as any of those procured 
for us by reason. And it is upon this knowledge of the heart and 
instinct that reason must rely and base all its arguments ... Those, 
therefore, to whom God has imparted religion by intuition are 
very fortunate and very rightly convinced.7 (p. 22)
So we may perfectly well know that God exists ... by faith we 
know his existence; in the light of glory we shall know his 
nature. (p. 93) (emphasis added)
These two writers make essentially the same point: The truth 
that God is real and has made covenant promises to human 
beings can be known by direct experience. Calvin holds that 
once the Spirit of God removes the blindness of a person’s 
mind, seeing the truth of the gospel is analogous to the self-
evidence of normal sense perception. Pascal, on the other 
hand, calls the experience an ‘intuition’ of truth and compares 
it to recognising the self-evidence of ‘first principles’ (axioms). 
Keep in mind that for these thinkers, as for the New Testament 
writers, belief in God is not knowledge merely in the sense 
7.Pascal’s contrast here between the intuition of first principles with ‘reason’ uses 
the latter term in the sense of reasoning. Obviously the intuition of rational first 
principles is part of reason broadly construed. 
of intellectual assent. The experience of ‘seeing’ the truth 
about God is the result of the work of God’s Spirit performed 
in the heart of the enlightened person where ‘heart’ is used in 
the biblical sense of that term. For Bible writers, I remind you, 
‘heart’ does not refer to emotion rather than intellect but to the 
central unity of a human being. So whereas you or I are used to 
speaking of head knowledge as opposed to heart knowledge and 
use such expressions to mean intellect as opposed to feeling, the 
Bible writers speak of the human heart as the unity of intellect, 
emotion, will, talents, dispositions and all else that makes up 
a person.8 For this reason, when the heart is enlightened, the 
intellect sees the truth ‘with the eyes of the heart’ and so knows 
God, whilst the emotions are turned towards God in love, and 
the will is inclined to please him. This is why enlightenment 
by God’s Spirit is called ‘conversion’ – the re-direction of the 
whole person. The whole person was lost to the sin of belief 
in a false god, and the whole person is now initiated into the 
process of being restored to a proper relationship with the true 
and living God. This is never merely intellectual, but is seated 
in the deepest dispositions of the heart – the centre of human 
existence. To sum up once more: 
1. Faith that God is real and has made covenant promises 
to human beings is not a matter of trusting a promise, let 
alone blind trust; rather 
2. It is self-evident knowledge acquired by direct experience, 
which is why 
3. Faith that God is real and offers us the gospel is neither a 
theory nor in need of proof. 
4. Faith in God, by contrast, goes beyond knowing God is 
real. It is taking God at his word concerning the promises 
and other truths he has revealed, and results in striving 
to obey his commandment to love him with all our heart, 
soul, mind and strength, and our neighbour as ourselves.
The meaning of ‘self-evident’
Most people are acquainted with the term ‘self-evident’ 
only from the famous lines of the American Declaration of 
Independence: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal and have been endowed by their 
Creator with unalienable rights ….’ So the first thing that 
needs to be said is that the Declaration used ‘self-evident’ in 
a way that is partly right but partly wrong. In philosophy, 
mathematics and logic it had long been recognised that a self-
evident belief is one whose truth is so obvious that no proof 
is necessary. It is a belief that is not inferred from any other 
belief, is prima facie true, and is irresistibly true. Thus there 
is no point in debating it. 
The part the Declaration deliberately ignored is that self-evident 
truths are defined as truths that are not derived from any other 
8.This also includes, of course, the exercise of trust or faith. Acts of faith are motivated 
by the dispositions of the heart, and are good indicators of its dispositions. Thus 
what a person trusts unconditionally reflects his or her divinity belief because only 
what exists unconditionally could be unconditionally trustworthy. Luther captured 
this point when he wrote: ‘What does it mean to have a God? As I have often said, 
the trust and faith of the heart alone make both God or an idol. If your faith and 
trust are right then your God is the true God ... if your trust is false and wrong, then 
you have not the true God. That to which your heart clings and entrusts itself is, I 
say, really your God’. (Luther 1959:365). Where a belief is in two (or more) divine 
principles, each is trusted as unconditionally real. For example, Aristotle had to 
admit that although matter was not changeless, it (as well as form) was nevertheless 
‘substance’ just because it is self-existent (Meta 1026a and 1036 a).  
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beliefs, for the belief in the legal equality of all human beings 
and that they possess rights was unquestionably derived from 
the Bible. It is an inference from the doctrine that all human 
beings are created in the image of God. In fact, the first draft 
of the Declaration acknowledged that when Jefferson wrote: 
‘We hold these truths to be sacred and undeniable’. The term 
‘sacred’ was his allusion to the biblical roots of the idea that 
all human beings have rights. But Franklin talked him into 
changing ‘sacred and undeniable’ into ‘self-evident’, which 
had two effects: it removed even the oblique reference to the 
biblical roots of the idea of equality and rights, and it conveyed 
the implicit claim that such rights were truths obtainable from 
reason alone (from rational self-evidence) without the aid 
of revelation. That is why those truths were supposed to be 
beyond debate. 
The fact is, however, that neither Jefferson nor Franklin 
really thought that the equal worth of all human beings was 
not derived from the biblical teaching that all are created in 
the image of God. Nor did they think that the equal rights 
of all people was a truth as obvious to everyone as 1 + 1 = 2. 
The appeal to self-evidence was intended to convey this 
message to King George III: We won’t debate this with you 
even if you disagree and think others are not equal to you 
because you are a king.9
With that mistake out of the way, I propose that the proper 
definition of the experience of self-evidence goes like this:
A belief, B, is self-evident to a person, P, if and only if:
1. B is directly produced in P by experience and is not 
believed by inference from other information10
2. B is experienced by P as prima facie true, and
3. B is initially irresistible to P. 
Each of the items in this definition will be explained shortly.
The traditional restrictions on self-evidence 
Now the claim that God’s reality can be self-evident to 
anyone will appear outrageous to those acquainted with the 
history of that idea in Western philosophy. Here’s why. 
The Grand Masters of the Western intellectual tradition 
concluded long ago that a belief is genuine knowledge rather 
than mere opinion provided it is either self-evident or proven.11 
9.This is not to suggest that there is no difference whatsoever between the self-
evidence of 1 + 1 = 2 and that of God’s reality. Arithmetical truths are simpler and 
clearer than ethical truths or divinity beliefs. My wife’s existence is also self-evident 
to me, but beyond that it has all the vagaries of any personal relationship. Our 
relation to God is similar; whilst his reality is no less certain than 1 + 1 = 2, the rest 
of our relationship with him has its ups and downs. 
10.Notice that I did not say it can’t be inferred, since any belief can trivially be made 
the conclusion of an inference. Rather, it means that it is not in fact believed on the 
grounds of inference from any premises which could entail it or show it probable.
11.See Aristotle’s Posterior analytics 72, b 5–24; 75 a 31–32. Aristotle’s point that self-
evident knowledge is basic to all proof has been denied at times, but even those 
denials inevitably end up appealing to self-evidence at some point. For example, E. 
Nagel (1954:304) ridiculed it as the idea that ‘there must be transparently luminous 
universal truths which the intellect grasps as self-evident’, and tried to substitute 
pragmatic utility in its place. And Stephan Barker even rejected self-evidence as the 
proper access to logical laws. He derided the experience as ‘a kind of penetrating 
and occult clairvoyance’ by which we succeed in ‘gazing into the abstract innards 
of the universe’ (Barker 1974:297). But how can Nagel know whether a principle is 
a pragmatic success or Barker know that a rule of logic ‘holds true in virtue of the 
ways words are used’ (p. 301) unless those things are self-evident to them? For a 
detailed critique of the pragmatist rejection of self-evidence (see Clouser 1997).
That seems to me too narrow a definition in a number of 
ways, but there is not the room here to critique the whole 
of this traditional view. For now I will focus only on how 
it handled self-evident knowledge. This is important both 
because its teaching about self-evident truth is false and 
because it has been remarkably dominant for more than 
2300 years. For whilst it might at first sound as though its 
view is congenial to belief in God since it allows that self-
evidence justifies a belief, thinkers such as Aristotle and 
Descartes not only acknowledged self-evidence but also 
put restrictions on it. And those restrictions rule out belief 
in God as genuinely self-evident – which is why Christians 
have so often been asked for proof that God is real. So if 
the New Testament position is to stand up, those traditional 
restrictions must be shown to fail. 
Before I do that, however, I want to explain why the other part 
of their idea of what justifies a belief – the requirement of proof 
– is a serious mistake with respect to God’s reality. This is an 
important point because so many Christian thinkers accepted 
the restrictions on self-evidence and therefore attempted to 
justify belief in God by proofs of his existence. The reason such 
a project is mistaken is not simply that the New Testament 
itself offers no proof, and it is even more than the fact that 
the New Testament specifically mentions experiencing God 
as the basis for belief in his reality instead of offering proof. 
The further reason is nothing less than the most fundamental 
doctrine in Christianity, the teaching that God is the Creator of 
‘everything visible or invisible’ (Col 1:16). 
Taken at face value, this requires that God is the Creator 
of all the laws found in the cosmos, including the laws of 
proof – the laws of mathematics and logic. Since these are 
amongst the ‘invisible’ realities, they too are created. But in 
that case, the laws of mathematics and logic do not account 
for their own origin.12 They are created laws that hold true 
for creatures and for God’s self-manifestations in the cosmos. 
But since whatever can be proven by use of them must be 
governed by them, nothing that can be proven by using them 
could be their uncreated origin. Therefore proof of the reality 
of God’s existence is impossible, because whatever can be 
proven would thereby not be God.
There is also another objection which the New Testament 
itself gives against arguments for God’s existence: they 
cannot persuade anyone. It teaches that those who do not 
believe in God fail to do so because their hearts are already 
captive to another divinity belief. We noticed earlier that in 
Romans 1 St Paul describes unbelievers as those who regard 
something God created as divine instead of the true Creator. 
This means that the failure to believe in God is not merely 
a lack; it is not just a matter of the absence of a true belief. 
Rather it is a matter of seeing something else as possessing 
12.There is a tradition of thought from Plato holding that a necessary truth does 
indeed account for its origin, since its necessity entails that it is self-existent. For 
example, Alvin Plantinga (2011:288) says that it is a ‘widely shared intuition’ that 
‘A proposition can’t be a necessary truth without existing necessarily’. He’s surely 
right not to give an argument for this point, as it would either be an egregious 
non-sequitur or commit outright equivocation. The fact that a relation holds 
necessarily for its relata does not mean or entail that the relation is itself uncaused 
and unpreventable, because it does not rule out that the relata as well as their de 
re necessary relations are mutually correlated creations of God.
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divine status. It is some such false perception of divinity that 
makes ineffectual every evidence and argument for God’s 
reality. Elsewhere, Paul puts it this way: 
A natural man does not receive the things of the Spirit of God, 
they are folly to him and he is unable to know them for they are 
spiritually discerned. (1 Cor 2:14; emphasis added)
In other words: holding a false divinity belief is sufficient to 
prevent the acquisition of the true one unless God’s Spirit 
enlightens the person holding the false belief. This is why 
no argument or assemblage of evidence for God’s reality 
will ever seem convincing to those whose hearts are already 
captured by a different divinity.
The following analogy may help to make this last point 
clearer. If I look out my office window and see someone jump 
out from behind a bush and stab another person who then 
falls to the ground, I dial 911 and rush out to give first aid. 
But if I’m attending a magic show, and on stage I see someone 
stabbed and fall down I applaud with the rest of the crowd. 
I don’t dial 911 and rush onstage to give first aid because my 
belief that what I’m seeing onstage is part of the show guides 
the beliefs I form about the events I see there. Confronted 
with the same events in both cases, I form utterly different 
beliefs about them. Just so, the New Testament position is 
that a person who believes in a putative divinity other than 
God will be guided by that belief in evaluating every piece 
of evidence and every argument for God’s reality. The force 
of such arguments and evidences will thus be blocked by 
that false divinity belief in such a way that they will fail 
to convince the person of the truth of God’s reality. Pascal 
(1960:198) saw this point clearly when he said: ‘We will never 
believe ... unless God inclines our hearts. And we will believe 
from the moment he does so incline them’.
The conclusion, then, must be that offering arguments and 
proofs for God’s reality is both wrong-headed and to no 
avail. Wrongheaded, because it demotes God to being a 
creature by subjecting him to the laws he built into creation. 
To no avail, because the heart captured by a false divinity 
belief cannot see the truth that God alone is the self-existent 
origin of everything visible or invisible.
This conclusion should not be disturbing despite the long 
history of Christian thinkers who mistakenly supposed 
God’s existence either could be or needed to be proven. 
For all the while they were doing that, the New Testament 
declared that it is only the Spirit of God that can remove 
the blindness of heart that naturally afflicts all humans from 
birth, and that once God does that the people to whom it 
happens will see for themselves the truth of God’s reality 
as self-evident. A paraphrase of this position is to say that 
although the human self-evidence antennae work well 
for truths of normal sensory perception, mathematics, 
logic, ethics, introspection, memory, and so forth, when 
it comes to what is divine our native equipment is faulty. 
Our antennae pick up something about the universe as the 
divine reality instead of its true Creator. 
Is this relativism? 
The fact that other religions make this same claim on behalf of 
their divinity beliefs troubles some Christians because they fear 
it will lead to relativism. If contrary beliefs have the same type 
of experiential ground, how can we prove which experience 
yields the truth? Won’t we be forced to concede that every 
divinity belief is equally true? This fear is unfounded. 
Whilst contrary experiences of self-evidence equally confer 
justification, they do not equally confer truth; intuitions of 
self-evidence are not infallible (we will see the reasons for 
this shortly). 
In fact, there is a long-standing recognition of conflicting 
intuitions of self-evidence in mathematics and logic, 
for example Kline (1980) and Quine (1970). From the 
fact that people see different axioms to be self evident in 
mathematics, or disagree about the range of the application 
of axioms of logic, it doesn’t follow that all those points of 
view are equally true. What does follow is that there is no 
neutral (non question-begging) way advocates of one point 
of view can prove their intuitions in such a way as to force 
them upon those with different intuitions of self-evidence. 
The two sets of disagreements are therefore alike in these 
respects, and we no more have neutral ground from which 
to prove our divinity belief to others than they have to 
prove theirs to us. This point naturally leads to questions 
about its consequences for Christian witness.
Consequences for Christian witness
What, then, of the presentation of the gospel to those who do 
not believe? Isn’t this undercut by the admission that there 
can be no proof of it? Surely not. 
Rather, it means that the way to approach non-believers 
with the gospel is not to attempt to argue them into belief 
but to challenge them to make an experiment in which they 
put themselves in a position to have a new and different 
experience. The experience to be sought is that of hearing 
God speak through his word, and the experiment is to 
undertake to read scripture (starting, say, with the gospel of 
John) and to precede each reading with the words: ‘If you’re 
really there, God, show me.’13 
The experiment should also include attending Christian 
worship as an observer, because seeing ordinary folk 
struggle with their understanding of the gospel is another 
way of exposing oneself to a new experience of it. After 
the experiment has been pursued for a while, it might also 
include reading some devotional and theological works as 
supplements. In all this, participants in the experiment need 
only assume that it is possible for them to have a different 
and belief-altering experience in which God speaks to them. 
If they won’t admit this is even possible, then there’s little 
13.This is not begging the question or a sneaky way of getting the experimenter to 
assume God’s reality. The words are purely hypothetical, and are spoken in case 
God exists. Any refusal to do this reflects a prior conviction that it’s not possible 
that God exists and so prevents the experiment from being performed in good faith. 
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point in the experiment. (But in that case I’d love to hear the 
reasons why it’s supposed to be impossible.) 
It is important that the reading-plus-worship-observation 
experiment be undertaken with the express purpose 
of hearing God speak. It is not to see if there is a coherent 
system of doctrine, an answer to a specific question, 
or merely to gather information. If the reading is done 
on the assumption that the gospel is a theory and the 
reading is undertaken to see whether holes can be picked 
in it, there’s no doubt they can be found. If it’s searched 
for inconsistencies, they’ll turn up as well. But that sort 
of thing is beside the point. The point of the reading is 
to discover whether any cluster of its central teachings is 
experienced as the truth about God from God – which is 
hearing God speak. 
Please notice that this experimental approach is nothing 
different from what we would recommend to a geometry 
student who couldn’t see the truth of, say, the axiom ‘things 
equal to the same thing are equal to each other’. Wouldn’t 
we recommend using it to construct proofs and to see how 
it fits with other geometric truths? Wouldn’t we compare 
its use to trying to do geometry without it? Wouldn’t we 
recommend working on geometry along with others to see 
how they employ it? Such recommendations may or may 
not result in the student’s seeing for him- or herself the 
axiom’s self-evident truth, but it is the only way such a 
student could be put into a position to see it.
We should be prepared for those who would reply to the 
proposed experiment this way: ‘I’ve already tried that 
experiment. I was raised in a Christian home and my 
parents took me to church. So I’ve often heard the scripture 
read and even had to memorise bits of it as a kid. So what 
would be the point of my doing it again?’ Although this 
may sound reasonable, it’s not. 
Consider a parallel case. Suppose I’d been raised by 
parents who were big Shakespeare fans. Suppose, too, 
that they regularly took me with them to weekly meetings 
of a Shakespeare Society where I heard 10 or 20 lines of 
several different plays read aloud each week. On reaching 
adulthood, I conclude that I don’t need any more exposure 
to know there’s nothing special about Shakespeare. Is that 
a fair judgement? Of course not. I’d have reached it without 
reading any of his works from beginning to end, let alone 
all of them. My exposure would have been sporadic and 
piecemeal, and would lack all the background information 
that could make his plays come alive. What is more, I’d 
have heard those piecemeal readings prior to becoming 
an adult. In this way my early experience, despite having 
been spread over many years, was both immature and 
insufficient to justify my conclusion. These same points 
are even more apropos with respect to the Bible. In my 
experience, most of those who object to the experiment by 
saying they’ve already heard the scriptures read have not 
read them as adults, with guidance, and whilst listening for 
God to speak.
Self-evident truth
The traditional restrictions on the experience of 
self-evidence
We have already taken note that the Grand Masters of the 
Western intellectual tradition – Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, 
amongst others – agreed on the question of how to distinguish 
beliefs that are merely opinions from beliefs whose certainty 
is justified. The consensus was: a belief counts as knowledge 
rather than mere opinion provided it is either self-evident or 
proven. Over the years since that consensus was formed there 
have been thinkers who have wanted to add beliefs arising 
from normal sensory perception to that list, or who have 
disputed one or even two of the traditional restrictions on 
self-evidence.14 But occasional dissent notwithstanding, the 
consensus on those restrictions has enjoyed remarkably wide 
acceptance. Of course, allowing that a belief is knowledge if 
self-evident or proven does not guarantee agreement on what 
those terms mean, and ever since this agreement was first 
reached (more than 2300 years ago) the debates over what 
‘proven’ means have raged unabated. But self-evidence has 
largely been treated as a settled matter, and for that reason 
never got the critical evaluation it deserved. There isn’t even 
an entry under that heading in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
for example, and the prevailing view of it has never been 
systematically challenged en toto [all together].
I hope to end that right here and now. I will argue that the 
traditional restrictions on self-evidence: (1) presuppose a 
Naturalist divinity belief and thus beg the question against 
the self-evidence of God’s existence, (2) are utterly unjustified, 
and that (3) there are excellent reasons to think every one of 
them is false. The restrictions lay down the requirements that 
to be genuinely self-evident a belief must not only be held as 
prima facie and irresistibly true without being inferred from 
any other beliefs, but must also be: 
1. recognised as true by all who understand it 
2. a necessary truth 
3. an infallible truth. 
Let’s begin with the religious background to these restrictions. 
For both Plato and Aristotle the rational order of the cosmos 
was divine. For Plato that divine order was the Forms, for 
Aristotle it was rational (secondary) substances. Both thinkers 
therefore took a Naturalist position with respect to the divine, 
as both identified the mathematical and/or logical order of 
the cosmos as the divine reality. Moreover, both included 
in their definition of divinity not only that it is what exists 
independently (which is held by all religions), but also added 
that it is changeless (which not every religion agrees with). 
These points all have to do with their divinity belief and their 
theory of reality, but both are important for their theory of 
knowledge. This is because both thinkers took the position 
that there must be a parity between reality and knowledge. 
In other words, they thought that what is most real must 
14.For example, Russell (at one time) accepted sensory perception as self-evident and 
thus rejected the necessity requirement (Russell 1997:56).
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also be most knowable (most certain). Thus they wanted to 
restrict sure and certain knowledge to beliefs about those 
things that have the most certain (divine) existence. This led 
them to deny, for example, that normal sensory perception 
ever yields knowledge at all! For them, perception can only 
yield uncertain opinion because perceptions are changeable 
and thus non-divine. In contrast, the rational truths of logic, 
mathematics and certain ontological axioms are ones they 
believed to have independent existence and never change, 
and so are the only certainties. 
Here’s another way to put their point: the only beliefs we can 
be sure of are ones that can’t change because what they are 
about can’t fail to exist and can’t change. So the mere fact that 
a belief is self-evident in the sense of being irresistibly prima 
facie true and not being inferred from other beliefs was not, 
for them, enough to make it a genuinely self-evident belief. 
On the contrary, they insisted that unless a belief also meets 
the three restrictions, and thus supports their rationalist 
commitment to the parity between divine reality and certain 
knowledge, it is to be rejected as genuinely self-evident belief. 
To summarise: Aristotle allows only what is self-evident, or 
proven from self-evident beliefs, to be certain and then: 
1. Allows only beliefs which are necessary truths (laws) to 
count as genuinely self-evident so that all seemingly self-
evident beliefs concerning anything that is changeable 
are to be dismissed.
2. Declares that all self-evident beliefs about necessary 
truths are known infallibly (thus conflating certainty 
with infallibility).
3. Finally, takes the position that any genuinely self-evident 
truth will be recognised as such by every expert (rational 
thinker) in the field in which it arises (Topics 142a:9–10). 
4. In this way he delivers to the Western tradition a tight 
package of restrictions concerning what is allowed 
to count as self-evident knowledge, a package whose 
contents are controlled by his divinity belief: self-evident 
knowledge is what all rational experts believe about the 
rationally necessary truths which are guaranteed to be 
infallible because they are immutable rational principles 
(Aristotle 1941).
The curious thing about this reductionist view of self-
evidence is that Aristotle nowhere argues for it! It’s what he 
wanted to be true, so he simply declared it to be so. Whilst 
he gives examples of instances of self-evident mathematical 
or logical truths which are also necessary truths and which 
were agreed on by all the experts he knew, he nowhere gives 
any reasons to suppose that all self-evident truths must be 
like the examples he gives. Moreover, as we will shortly see, 
these restrictions have absolutely nothing to recommend 
them other than his wishful thinking. 
For this reason the extent to which even thinkers who 
didn’t share his divinity belief have bought into his 
restrictions anyway is truly amazing. This includes 
Descartes, who not only endorsed Aristotle’s restrictions 
but contributed to them. It was Descartes’s proposal to 
expand on restriction three – the one that says all experts 
will recognise a genuinely self-evident truth. It’s not just 
the experts, says Descartes, but anyone ‘in the least degree 
rational’ will recognise a genuinely self-evident truth 
provided that he understands it (Descartes 1958:6–10). It 
is Descartes’s democratised version of this restriction that 
came to be regarded as the very hallmark of self-evidence 
by the 20th century.
My critique of these traditional restrictions begins from the 
standpoint that self-evidence is an experience. The notion 
that self-evidence is a property of a proposition (or of a 
belief) is only part of the truth about it. It can also be the 
property of things directly experienced whether or not we 
ever form a proposition about them. Moreover, in order to 
be ‘evident’, a belief must be evident to someone. It makes no 
sense to say that a belief is evident in itself, for ‘evident’ is an 
‘intentional term’ – a term that connotes a relation requiring 
both a subject and an object. For example, it makes no sense 
to say that something is seen though no one sees it, just as it 
makes no sense to say someone hears if that person doesn’t 
hear anything. In the same way, it makes no sense to say 
that something is evident unless there is someone to whom 
it is evident.15 Moreover, both the truth of a self-evident 
belief and its recognition also depend on an even wider 
relation to the rest of reality. ‘This class is now in session’ is 
self-evident to those in the class, but once the class is over 
it becomes self-evidently false. Finally, a person’s ability to 
recognise self-evidence is also relative to his or her prior 
information, skills and mindset. A hunting guide sees game 
where a tenderfoot sees nothing. 
For these reasons, self-evidence needs to be understood as 
an experience and that experience needs to be described. So 
here, again, is my proposal for its definition:
A belief, B, is self-evident to a person, P, if and only if:
1. B is directly produced in P by experience and is not 
believed by inference from other information
2. B is experienced by P as prima facie true
3. B is initially irresistible to P. 
Item one recognises that self-evident beliefs have in common 
that they are simply produced in us by some experience 
rather than being inferred from other information. By 
‘experience’ I mean (for now) the ordinary and reliable 
modes of acquiring information16 such as normal perception, 
memory, introspection, or rational reflection, regardless of 
the particular object of the experience.
We all form beliefs every day which are produced in us by 
each of these reliable modes of experience, and many of 
them have the quality of self-evidence because they satisfy 
the three conditions mentioned above. An example of a self-
15.This does not rule out, however, that a belief can be self-evident but remain 
subconscious or unconscious.
16.It was Alston (1991) who introduced the notion that justification must start with 
our doxastic practices rather than with beliefs taken individually. 
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evident belief produced by perception is your belief that the 
words you are now seeing are really before you. You are not 
inferring their existence from other information; rather, your 
experience of seeing them is directly producing in you the 
belief that they are really there. Self-evident memory beliefs 
include your name, address and telephone number. The 
experience of remembering them reactivates in you those 
beliefs in a direct way that differs from inference. Likewise, 
you can introspect and find that you are tired or there’s an 
ache in your back or whatever. Such introspective beliefs are 
also simply produced in you rather than being conclusions 
at the end of a chain of reasoning. Finally, there are beliefs 
that arise just from reflecting upon something – the sort of 
experience many thinkers have called ‘rational intuition’. For 
example, you can think of 1 + 1 = 2 and just ‘see’ that in the 
natural number series it is necessarily true. None of these 
sample beliefs are arrived at via a process of reasoning from 
other information; rather they are produced in you by one or 
another normally reliable mode of experience.17 
Item two calls attention to the fact that all the examples 
given in the previous paragraph are ones we experience 
as prima facie true. Their truth is not a guess (hypothesis), 
nor is it suggested by other beliefs or believed on the 
recommendation of other people; in each case the beliefs 
themselves look glaringly true. 
Item three asserts that such beliefs are ones we find to be 
irresistible. This means that when we initially form them 
we can’t get ourselves to disbelieve them.18 It doesn’t mean 
they can’t ever change or be rejected; in fact, everyone 
spontaneously and regularly checks on them in a number 
of ways. One way is that they are checked against other 
self-evident and well-established beliefs. For example, if I 
look out the window and see that it’s raining, it instantly 
becomes impossible for me to disbelieve it’s raining. But if 
I then notice a group of laughing friends gathered around 
holographic equipment that is projecting a rainstorm onto 
my window, I can reject the first experience of self-evidence 
by comparing it to this second one. People normally also 
check their self-evident beliefs with those of others, and at 
times reflect upon how well a self-evident belief comports 
with their overall experience or upon whether it helps to 
make sense of it. Finally, self-evident beliefs can also be 
rejected in response to a change in the experience of self-
evidence. In sum: the initial irresistibility of a belief can 
grow over time by being tested and confirmed, just as it can 
be diminished or lost by being disconfirmed.
17.This is not to deny that unusual experiences can also produce beliefs which are 
prima facie and irresistibly true, but for now I’m thinking only of the intuition of self 
evidence as it attaches to ordinary sorts of experiences which are unquestionably 
reliable doxastic practices (perception, memory, introspection and rational 
reflection). More specifically, I am speaking of the self-evidence attaching to the 
experience of reflecting on the gospel that was chosen because it is the only type 
of religious experience common to all believers in God. 
18.This is a point on which Descartes led the Western philosophical tradition astray by 
construing a self-evident belief as one we are unable to doubt. But doubt is not the 
opposite of certainty, disbelief is. And what Calvin says about belief in God applies 
to many other self-evident beliefs as well: ‘... we speak not of an assurance which 
is never affected by doubt, nor a security which anxiety never assails, we rather 
maintain that believers have a perpetual struggle with their own distrust’ (Calvin 
1953, III:ii, 17). 
Please notice that there are several things people often 
associate with self-evidence that I’ve deliberately excluded 
from this description. 
For one thing, I did not say that a self-evident belief is one 
that must be seen to be true immediately upon understanding 
it (some are, some are not).19 Nor did I say that seeing a truth 
as self-evident doesn’t ever require training, reflection, or 
comparison and judgement. Reflection and comparison are 
also experiences, and they are indispensable accompaniments 
to the experience of self-evidence. For example, many years 
ago I learned to tune pianos. It took an apprenticeship of ear 
training for me to learn to hear whether a tone was sharp or 
flat compared to another. But now that I have learned how to 
do that, it is self-evident to me whenever one pitch is out of 
tune with another. 
This last example also serves to dislodge another mistake 
that is often assumed about self-evidence: namely, the idea 
(rejected earlier) that it takes no background information 
or conditioning to apprehend a self-evident truth. Not so. 
A striking example of this point is given by Tobias Danzig, 
who tells of a tribe in Africa whose language contained only 
words for one, two, and many (Danzig 1954:5). Without the 
concept and word for 4 it couldn’t be self-evident to those 
people that 2 + 2 = 4, whilst for those who have been initiated 
into arithmetic the judgement 2 + 2 = 4 is as self-evident as 
anything can be. 
Since seeing the self-evidence of a belief does not exclude 
reflection or comparison, and since it need not happen 
instantaneously, there is no inconsistency in my now claiming 
that parts two and three of the description of ‘self-evident’ are 
themselves self-evident. You need only to compare them to 
your own experiences of self-evident beliefs to confirm their 
accuracy, and comparing them to your experiences won’t 
disqualify them as genuinely self-evident. It is on that basis 
that it is self-evident to me that the parts of the description 
are indeed elements of those beliefs. But I mean by this that 
the description fits them as we actually experience them, aside 
from the restrictions placed on them by Aristotle and Descartes – the 
restrictions that rule out belief in God. 
So what are we to make of those restrictions? If genuine 
knowledge consists of beliefs that are self-evident or 
proven, as they thought, then surely it is fair to ask whether 
their restrictions are self-evident or proven. That is the question 
which has never been asked over the many centuries of 
their nearly universal acceptance. But it must be asked. For 
if their restrictions are neither self-evident nor proven, then 
they cannot count as knowledge, given their own definition 
of knowledge.
A critique of the traditional restrictions on  
self-evidence
Critique: Everybody Requirement (first restriction)
I’ll begin with the restriction insisted on by Descartes, and 
now widely accepted as the very definition of ‘self-evident’. 
19.Aquinas (1960:38) did say that everyone recognises a self-evident truth ‘at once’ 
upon understanding it. 
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It is what I call the everybody requirement. It says that for a 
belief to be genuinely self-evident, every person who is ‘in 
the least degree rational’ and understands the statement 
of it must see it to be self-evidently true (Descartes 1958:6). 
This has often been used to reject the self-evidence of God’s 
reality. For example, Anthony Quinton has tried to argue 
that intuitions of the self-evidence of logical truths are 
genuine because everyone agrees with them, whilst that 
is not true of claims of moral and mystical (religious) self-
evidence. Quinton (1973) says: 
What is significant is the fact of universal agreement, amongst 
all but the muddled or deliberately perverse, that a particular 
set of beliefs are true. Every proposition has been disputed by 
somebody. But the dialectician who claims to deny the law of 
contradiction is insincere ... It is the failure of this ... requirement 
of universal agreement that undermines the claims of moral and 
mystical intuition. (p. 125)
Notice that Quinton first claims there is a set of beliefs that 
are universally agreed upon, but that the set then turns out to 
have only one member. He also admits that even this single 
‘universally agreed upon’ belief actually has dissenters 
(‘every proposition has been disputed by somebody’) and 
so is not universally agreed upon! To compound his felony, 
he then dismisses those who disagree by substituting name-
calling (‘muddled or insincere’) for argument. In doing so, 
he wilfully ignores not just a few muddled minds but the 
entire tradition of Hindu and Buddhist mystics who have for 
millennia denied his candidate for universal acceptance so 
that his dismissal of them begs the question. 
So what can be said in favour of this restriction when it’s 
clear that not even the law of non-contradiction can satisfy 
it? Can it be defended? More specifically, can the restriction 
itself be proven or qualify as self-evident? Let’s start with 
whether it can be proven. 
There is an initial difficulty with this restriction that 
makes its proof problematic in excelsis: How could we ever 
discover that any belief at all meets the requirement? You 
see, ‘everybody’ cannot mean just those now living; it has 
to mean all human beings no matter when they lived or 
will live. So even if we could discover that every person on 
earth now sees a particular belief to be self-evidently true, 
that would tell us nothing about whether all the dead also 
believed it to be true or whether all the unborn will agree 
with it in the future. For this reason we cannot discover, 
for any particular belief, whether it meets the requirement. 
But if we cannot tell for any belief whether it has this 
characteristic, there is no way to prove that all self-evident 
beliefs must have it. For the restriction to be correct it would 
have to be universally true in order to be necessarily true. So 
if we can’t discover that universal acceptance is in fact true 
of any self-evident beliefs, there is no way to show it is true 
of all of them.  In that case this restriction cannot be proven 
to be a genuine requirement for a belief to be self-evident. 
 
Let me put this same point in another way. The inaccessibility 
of what people believed in the past or will believe in the 
future is not merely a practical snag, but is fatal to any 
inductive evidence in favour of this restriction. Since we 
can’t survey everyone, no belief whatever can be known to 
meet its requirement. Therefore there can be no evidence 
that the Everybody Requirement applies to any self-evident 
truth, let alone to every one of them. But if we can’t know 
that all beliefs experienced as self-evident in fact have this 
characteristic, then we’re in no position to argue that they 
all must have it. Nor can we gather information that would 
give us premises from which to infer deductively that the 
requirement is genuine. Hence this restriction is not merely 
in fact unproven, but is unprovable in principle. Therefore, 
if it is to qualify as knowledge, the everybody requirement 
must itself be self-evident. Is it? 
The answer is ‘no’, because it is not self-evident to me. 
I am not alone in that respect, but even if I were, the restriction 
would still fail its own requirement for self-evidence. Thus 
it is hoist with its own petard. And since it is neither self-
evident nor proven, it is not knowledge but mere opinion. 
Perhaps this shouldn’t be too surprising. After all, if correct, 
the everybody requirement would rule out the self-evidence of 
such beliefs as: these words are now before you; there are 
real objects external to you; other people have minds; and 
your name, address and telephone number. The surprising 
thing is not that this restriction fails, but that it was ever 
taken seriously. But taken seriously it certainly was! Since 
the time of Descartes, dozens of the best minds have tried 
for centuries to prove that there are really objects around us, 
that other people have minds, and that God exists. And the 
only reason they thought such proofs were needed was that 
the self-evidence of those beliefs had been ruled out by this 
restriction and its companions.
Critique: Necessity Requirement (second restriction)
The next restriction, one proposed by Aristotle, insists that 
to be genuinely self-evident a belief must be a necessary 
truth. That means it must be a law of some kind, that is, a 
truth that either cannot be conceived to be false or which 
cannot be altered by any power or change of circumstances 
in the cosmos. Here are some examples of necessary truths: 
1 + 1 = 2; things equal to the same thing are equal to each 
another; nothing can appear red and green all over at the 
same time; all bachelors are unmarried; and 79 × 125 = 9875. 
(Please notice that since it is not a necessary truth that these 
words are before you, that there are objects around you, or 
that other people have minds, this restriction rules out the 
self-evidence of those beliefs every bit as much as did the 
‘everybody’ requirement.) 
Now many (but not all) necessary truths are known because 
their necessity is self-evident; that is, you can just ‘see’ not 
only that they are true but that they cannot be made false 
by any conceivable change in circumstances. 1 + 1 = 2 is an 
example. But the fact that many necessary truths are known 
because they are self-evident is not what is at stake here. 
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What is in question right now is different. It’s whether only 
necessary truths can be self-evident. So let’s now do what 
we did with the Everybody Requirement, and ask whether 
the Necessity Requirement is itself self-evident or proven. 
We start with whether it’s self-evident. To know whether 
it is self-evident, we would first have to know whether the 
restriction meets its own requirement. That is, we must know 
whether it’s a necessary truth that all self-evident beliefs 
must be necessary truths. Is that self-evident? 
There is an insurmountable difficulty with asserting that it’s 
self-evident the restriction meets its own requirement: the 
claim is hopelessly circular. We would have to know that the 
requirement is a necessary truth in order to know it is self-
evident, and we’d need to know it is self-evident to know it is 
a necessary truth! So although it must be both or neither, we 
are left with no way of telling which. As a result, the necessity 
requirement cannot itself be known on the grounds that it is 
self-evident. So can its own necessity be proven? 
No one has ever even tried to offer a proof that this restriction 
is true – or even that it meets its own requirement. 
Think of that. No proof has even been attempted in the 
more than 2300 years since it was proposed! No doubt that’s 
because it’s hard to imagine what a proof of it could possibly 
look like. What could serve as undoubtedly true premises 
from which to deduce this restriction? How could any 
proposed premises for it be so undeniable as to make us give 
up the experienced self-evidence of such a (non-necessary) 
belief as that these words are now before you? No doubt it 
is obstacles such as these which have prevented attempts 
at proving this restriction. The fact that no one has ever 
deduced it from other premises isn’t conclusive, however, 
because there is yet another way to argue that a belief is a 
necessary truth. The other way consists of showing it has a 
self-contradictory denial. Here’s what that means. 
Take the statement: ‘All bachelors are unmarried.’ To deny 
that, we’d have to assert: ‘Some bachelors are married.’ Is 
the concept of a married bachelor self-contradictory? Surely 
it is. But if ‘some bachelors are married’ contradicts itself, 
that constitutes a proof that ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ 
is a necessary truth. Here’s another example: ‘No circles 
are squares.’ To deny this we must affirm: ‘There is at least 
one circle that is also a square.’ Is a square circle an absurd 
self-contradiction? It sure is. And in that case ‘No circles are 
squares’ is proven to be a necessary truth. 
Now try this same test with the Necessity Restriction on 
self-evidence. Here is its denial: ‘There is at least one self-
evident truth that is not a necessary truth.’ Is that patently 
self-contradictory in the way married bachelors or square 
circles are? Is it an absurd contradiction to think that it’s 
self-evident that the words you are now seeing are really 
before you? Of course not! There is not the slightest reason 
to think that if you deny the restriction you contradict 
yourself. But if the Necessity Restriction cannot be proven 
from other premises to be a necessary truth, and if it cannot 
be shown to have a self-contradictory denial, then it cannot 
be proven to be a necessary truth at all. 
Since we have already seen why its necessity can’t be self-
evident, the conclusion must be that this requirement is 
neither self-evident nor proven. Thus it, too, is hoist on its own 
petard every bit as much as is the Everybody Requirement. 
They are both in the same (sunken) epistemological boat. 
Neither of them has any proof, and each fails to meet its own 
requirement for being self-evident. Therefore on the view of 
knowledge advocated by the proposers of these restrictions, 
they cannot be knowledge but are mere opinions. 
Bad opinions. 
Bad because the evidence against both restrictions persists 
in everyone’s experience all day every day. That evidence 
consists of the beliefs which are experienced as self-evident 
but which do not meet the ‘everybody’ or ‘necessity’ 
requirements. Once again, these beliefs include such 
examples as perceptual beliefs (there are objects around us, 
including these words which you now see), memory beliefs 
(our names and addresses), introspective beliefs (that you 
have a slight headache). There are also a myriad self-evident 
beliefs produced by rational reflection: the belief that 1 + 1 = 
2 and that being circular excludes being square, for example.
Critique: Infallibility requirement (third restriction)
The last of the three restrictions on what is allowed to count 
as self-evident is also from Aristotle and was repeated by 
Descartes. It is the Infallibility Requirement. This restriction 
requires that to be genuinely self-evident a belief must be 
infallibly true (Aristotle 1941:113; Descartes 1958:10). 
Please do not confuse infallibility with certainty. For a belief 
to be infallible it would have to be impossible for us to be 
wrong about it, and we do not have to be infallible to be 
certain of something beyond a reasonable doubt. 
No doubt you are certain that the words you are reading 
right now are really before you, and you are justified in 
that certainty because their existence is self-evident to you. 
But that doesn’t mean that it’s impossible for you ever to be 
mistaken about anything you see, so you are not acquiring 
that belief by means of an infallible capacity. Understand, 
then, that the infallibility requirement is an extremely strong 
claim. It means that all genuinely self-evident beliefs must 
be ones that could not possibly be false under any circumstances. 
If a belief is formed by a capacity of ours that can ever be 
mistaken, or if there is any conceivable circumstance under 
which it could be false, it is not an infallible belief. 
There are several things amiss with this restriction. 
Firstly, there is a broad, general objection to this requirement 
that stems from an attitude engendered by our Christian 
heritage. That attitude warns us against ‘thinking of 
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ourselves more highly than we ought to think’ (Rm 12:3). 
The objection begins by asking ourselves: What would ever 
tempt us to suppose we have any belief-forming capacity 
that is infallible? To this question there is, in Genesis, a scary 
answer. For Genesis records that the fall into sin occurred 
when human beings caved in to the temptation of wanting 
to be divine! Keep in mind that the temptation was not 
simply to eat forbidden fruit. Rather it went like this: ‘If you 
disobey God, you will know good and evil just as he does’. 
So there is something very sinister about being tempted to 
think there is any capacity we have for knowing as God 
does – for having knowledge that is infallible.
Consider this: our perception is generally reliable but 
not infallible; our memories are generally reliable but not 
infallible; introspective beliefs are likewise reliable but not 
infallible, and our reasoning is generally reliable but not 
infallible. What good reason can we have, then, to suppose 
that our capacity to intuit self-evident truths is any different? 
Since we can still be justifiably certain of a belief without 
being infallible, let’s leave infallibility to God.
Secondly, this restriction can’t be defended by claiming it’s 
self-evident because that would involve the same vicious 
circularity we found to be the case for claiming the necessity 
requirement is self-evident. We would have to know the 
restriction to be infallible to know it is self-evident, and we 
would have to know it is self-evident to know it is infallible. 
Thus it could be neither just as well as it could be both, and 
we are left with no way to decide. 
Finally, there is also no proof for this restriction. In this case, 
too, no one has ever so much as attempted an argument 
to show that every genuinely self-evident belief must be 
infallible, and once again I doubt anyone can even imagine 
what such a proof would look like. The reason for that doubt 
is that there seems to be a conceivable set of circumstances 
under which almost any belief, no matter how certain it 
seems, could possibly be mistaken. Take, for example, the 
belief that 1 + 1 = 2. Wouldn’t that look just as true if Alpha 
Centaurians were bombarding our brains with Tachyon 
waves so as to make it look certain when it is really false? 
(Notice that a set of circumstances doesn’t have to be real 
to defeat the infallibility of a belief; it needs only to be 
conceivable.) The conceivable circumstance that some force is 
controlling your brain so as to make you believe that 1 + 1 = 2 
or that the words you’re now seeing are really before you is 
enough to show that you don’t know those things infallibly. 
This last point all by itself is enough to defeat the infallibility 
of the infallibility requirement. Ask yourself: Is the belief ‘all 
genuinely self-evident truths must be known infallibly’ itself 
an infallible truth? The answer can only be ‘no’ because even 
if it looks true to you, it could still be false if some force were 
controlling your mind to make it look true. So this restriction 
also fails to meet its own requirement. As with the necessity 
requirement, it is therefore neither self-evident nor proven.
Some readers may be tempted to object at this point that 
there surely are some beliefs that are infallible, namely the 
ones we call ‘incorrigible’ beliefs – beliefs about how our 
own internal states seem to us that just could not be false. 
This is surely right. We can’t be mistaken that, for example, 
our head seems to hurt, even if it were only because Alpha 
Centaurians were making us think so. But such beliefs are still 
not formed by a capacity that is infallible. They are formed by 
introspection, which is notoriously fallible – when it comes to 
our own motives, for example. Moreover, even incorrigible 
beliefs involve judgement, and we do at times revise those 
judgements. I may tell you in all sincerity that I have a 
headache but on later reflection come to believe that what 
I really experienced was a toothache. These examples don’t 
undermine the point that we have beliefs about how things 
seem to us at a particular time that are (taken individually) 
unfalsifiable even if acquired by a fallible capacity. 
But the fact that there are such beliefs doesn’t show much. All 
it shows is that a very limited class of beliefs about how our 
internal states seem to us cannot be wrong. That, however, 
doesn’t give us the slightest reason to suppose that all 
genuinely self-evident beliefs must be like them, or that they 
alone are the only genuinely self-evident beliefs. Moreover, 
there is keen irony in the fact that incorrigible beliefs, which 
are the best candidates for infallibility, necessarily fail the 
‘everybody’ and ‘necessity’ requirements! 
Conclusion 
The conclusion is obvious. None of the restrictions can 
count as self-evident, and none of them has any proof. 
Furthermore, none of them meets either its own requirement 
or the requirements of its companion restrictions. The 
conclusion must be that none of them is justified. They are 
but unsupported opinions. 
Moreover, they are opinions held in the face of the implacable 
fact that they are at odds with everyone’s experiences of 
self-evidence every day. They are, therefore, amongst the 
most unwarranted influential proposals ever to burden an 
intellectual tradition. There is not the slightest reason for 
allowing them to overrule everyone’s experiences to the 
contrary. Rather, they should be dismissed with prejudice, 
and the Grand Masters of our intellectual tradition should 
no longer be allowed to dictate from on high what they will 
permit us to count as self-evident. It is time that self-evidence 
be understood from the bottom up rather than from the top 
down. It should be understood from the reports of what 
people in fact experience to be self-evident, not from what 
a few philosophers wish it to be. If we do that, not only will 
such beliefs as those of the reality of objects around us – along 
with our names, addresses and telephone numbers, that other 
people have minds, and that the words you now see are really 
there – turn out to be self-evident; so will the belief that God is real 
for those who experience that as self-evident. 
The upshot is that self-evident knowledge is justified 
belief and is sufficient for certainty beyond a reasonable 
doubt despite the fact that it does not entail truth. Thus 
contrary beliefs may be equally justified to different people 
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owing to their differing experiences of self-evidence. That 
conclusion is contrary to the rationalist tradition, but it is 
not irrationalism or total relativism when viewed from a 
Theistic standpoint. It is less than rationalism has wanted, 
but is realistic about our human condition; it is the actual 
state of affairs for our knowledge of the entire spectrum of 
human experience. We simply are not the embodiments of 
neutral, divine rationality that Plato and Aristotle wished 
us to be. 
Thus there is simply no good reason to dismiss as spurious 
the experience of billions of people who find it self-evident 
that the gospel is the truth about God from God. On the 
contrary, they are as entitled to be as certain of that as you 
are that these words are now before you. 
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